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THE CONGRESS OF PARIS 
our last lecture we studied the persons and the policies IN of the congress which met to divide Napoleon’s gaudy 
coat of many colors and to inaugurate a new age of peace 
under the banner of legitimacy. Fo r  with all its selfishness, 
there had been a little idealism too, such as it was, and at  
least some of its members would have subscribed quite read- 
ily to the words of the French author who was then writ- 
ing: “I belong to the general community of all mankind 
who since the beginning of the world have prayed to God.” 
T h e  authors of  the final act at Vienna had met more than 
once afterward. They had imposed peace a second time on 
the finally beaten Emperor, and had sent him to weave his 
legend in the solitude of St. Helena. They had accepted the 
words of Alexander and signed the pact of the Holy Alli- 
ance, in which each promised before God that he would rule 
his people with justice and behave toward the others as a 
brother. Four of them had later promised to make peace 
compulsory by forever destroying among them the spirit of 
unrest and revolution from which they thought the world 
derived its troubles. And from their frequent councils had 
gone forth the troops which had quelled popular risings in 
Naples, in Piedmont, and in Spain. T h e  first rift in their 
arrangements had come when England, whose commerce 
was now expanding, had refused to help put down the newly 
won independence of the Spanish colonies, and when, on the 
hint of Canning, John Quincy Adams had written the mem- 
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orable state paper which was to be forever known as the 
Monroe Doctrine. 
Now all were dead save Metternich, and he was living 
in retirement, having been blown aside by the storms of  
1848. In his own country, power had fallen from the trem- 
bling hand of Ferdinand, and even the young Francis Joseph 
had barely been held on what seemed then the most precari- 
ous throne in Europe by the fierce soldiers of his “brother,” 
Nicholas of Russia. With what kingly gratitude he repaid 
this debt we shall soon see. I t  was an hour of new prob- 
lems, for into western Europe had come the age of factories 
and capital, of great industrial cities with their slums, and 
under the leadership of men like Louis Blanc in France and 
Robert Owen in England the people had begun to ask 
strange new questions and to dream even stranger dreams. 
In  international affairs, the revolt of Greece had awakened 
the national instincts of many a submerged people, and the 
peace which Russia had dictated to the Sultan under the 
walls of Adrianople had proved to the members of the still 
Holy Alliance that they were not only brothers, as the dead 
Alexander had said, but also expectant heirs waiting with 
scarcely concealed eagerness a t  the bedside of what every- 
body believed to be the very, very sick man of Europe- 
strangely convalescent in these days, it sometimes seems. In  
this expectant heirship lay the real cause of the war  which 
was to end what Tennyson was calling “the long, long canker 
of peace,” and to furnish the occasion of the second of the 
great peace congresses of the nineteenth century. 
In  the year 1853, three men were the masters of the des- 
tinies of Europe-Louis Napoleon, Nicholas of Russia, and 
Lord  Palmerston-each destined to play a leading part  in 
the great farce which was even then being rehearsed. Of 
these three, Nicholas and Palmerston had long been promi- 
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nent, while Napoleon was at the very beginning of his aston- 
ishing career. In  political ideals the three had much in com- 
mon, although their methods were so different that each 
would undoubtedly have regarded it as a great insult to have 
been told so frankly. I t  is often easier to say those things 
af ter  men are dead. “The methods of Nicholas were those 
of the lion-tamer; he had conquered by terror, and his trust 
was in steel whips and iron bars. Napoleon had charmed 
the monster’s ear with soothing phrases, had slipped a bit 
between its teeth and blinkers over its eyes, and harnessed it 
in triumph to the car of Empire.”l T o  this very day men 
are hopelessly divided as to the real character of the strange 
adventurer, with his affable winning ways, who looked out 
from the mask of a smiling face with those half-closed eyes 
which never smiled. Was  this second Napoleon a mere 
trickster and an actor, always wearing his dead uncle’s hat 
and coat to hide his petty spirit, as he had worn them in the 
flesh when first he sought to win the garrison at Strassburg? 
O r  was he, after all, something of a statesman who saw 
beneath the forms of things the moving spirit of the times? 
Was  he a dreamer, as Bismarck thought, o r  was Cavour 
right when he called him the most positive genius of his day? 
Did he love absolutism for  its own sake, o r  did he merely 
use it as a Stepping-stone to liberty? W e  know perfectly 
well what Napoleon did, but who can say with any dogmatic 
certainty what he was? Perhaps he did not quite know this 
himself, and played his various parts with such sincerity that 
they came to dominate and even to control him. Clotilde, 
his cousin, who was once destined to be his wife, said of him 
long before he became emperor o r  famous: “If Louis be- 
comes my husband, I will crack his head open to find out 
what thoughts, if any, are inside.” Maybe that is the reason 
1 Phillips, “Modern Europe,” p. 332. 
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they never married, and that Eugknie came to be empress in 
the Tuileries. 
If we have trouble in getting a clear impression of the 
French ruler, the qualities of Nicholas stand out in bold 
relief. T h e  third son of Paul, he was only five years old 
when his brother Alexander became czar. H i s  mother 
brought him up with the greatest care, always fearful that 
some liberal notion might slip in to contaminate the purity 
of his royal mind. Needless to say, no L a  Harpe  was pro- 
vided for  this young prince. Instead his chief tutor was a 
certain old Prussian soldier, whom the boy called “Papa 
Lamsdorf.” From him Nicholas learned the soldierly vir- 
tues, directness, courage, love of order and authority; and 
he had no trace of the dreamy idealism which had marked 
the earlier career of his brother. H i s  creed could be 
summed up in three words, Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and 
Nationality, o r  more fully in the words of one of the most 
influential writers of his time: “A nation is not a chance 
creation, but a living organism. Sovereignty comes from 
God. I ts  nature is not to be despotic but absolute. Legiti- 
mate kings are God’s delegates to preserve the traditions 
and the unity of the past with the present.” Alexander died 
in 1825, just a hundred years after his illustrious ancestor, 
Peter the Great, “of sheer weariness of life,” as Metternich 
said, disillusioned and utterly discouraged at the hopeless 
compromise between absolutism and liberty. Among his 
papers was found a message to his successor, written a t  the 
Congress of Vienna, in which he expressed his own political 
ideals: “The Russian Empire is an autocratic state, and 
whether we consider its dimensions o r  its geographic posi- 
tion, the degree of its education o r  many other circum- 
stances, we must admit that this form of government is the 
only one which will be proper for Russia for many years.” 
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Whatever doubts existed in the mind of his brother were 
entirely absent from that of the soldierly young prince who 
now succeeded to the throne. T h e  very first incident in his 
long reign was ominously significant. Constantine, the elder 
brother, was an erratic prince who was thought to have 
liberal views; and when he refused to take the vacant throne, 
the liberals started a revolution in the capital with the cry, 
“Constantine and the constitution I” At  the trial of the 
rioters it came out that some of the common soldiers be- 
lieved that “Constitution” was Constantine’s kindly Polish 
wife. Nicholas was no man to  be trifled with. Shots were 
fired, the crowd dispersed, and the fleeing rioters were pur- 
sued without pity by the mounted Cossacks. So many bodies 
were thrown into the river and became frozen in the ice, that 
an order was issued not to  use the water that winter. Nicho- 
las always believed that on that December day he had saved 
Russia from inevitable perdition. W e  have a nai’ve letter 
which he wrote to  his brother, apologizing for a certain soft- 
ness; for  when the court had ordered the leaders to be 
quartered, he had commuted the punishment for some to  
ordinary hanging, which he seemed to think a luxurious 
form of death. h4any others were sent to spend the rest of 
their days in the salt-mines of Siberia. In his external policy 
he was dominated by the idea that Russia, with her great 
army, was to be the chief of police for Europe. When the 
news of the February revolution reached him, he was sur- 
rounded by his nobles. “Saddle your horses, gentlemen ; a 
revolution has been proclaimed in France I ”  But France 
was too far  away, especially with discontent so much nearer 
to his doors, and he satisfied himself for the moment with 
issuing a strange manifesto against the western liberals, 
ending with words which to-day might emanate from his 
royal relative at Potsdam: “God is with us! Take  heed, 0 
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Nations, and submit, for God is with us!’’ Throughout his 
career there is no reason for doubting that within his judg- 
ment, which was narrow, and by his lights, which were dim, 
he sincerely desired the good of Russia and her church. But 
there remained in Russia the autocracy above, serfdom 
below, and the reign of anarchy among administrators and 
1 a ndo wn ers. 
Toward Turkey, Nicholas inherited the policy of expan- 
sion which came down to him unbroken from the days of 
Peter the Great. H e  believed that Russia was the predes- 
tined saviour of the fourteen millions of Christian subjects 
who groaned under the heavy rule of the Sultan. T h e  Greek 
revolt gave him his great opportunity, and in two campaigns 
the Russian arms were carried almost within the shadow of 
the Sultan’s capital ( I 829).  Greece was independent, and 
Roumania and Servia were to be autonomous states under 
the sovereign protection of Russia. In case of disturbance, 
Russia was given much the same right of intervention which 
the United States has to-day in Cuba. Four  years later, 
Nicholas helped Turkey to  put down an insurrection which 
might have destroyed the Sultan’s power, and as a reward 
the two states signed a secret treaty which allowed Russia 
to close the straits against any of her enemies in time of 
war. I t  was now evident enough that the control of Con- 
stantinople was the supreme ambition of the Russian auto- 
crat, and England, under the leadership of Palmerston, 
stepped in to interfere and began to pose as the protector 
of the Sultan against the aggressions of his too powerful 
neighbor. Nicholas maintained his supremacy at  Constanti- 
nople by fear alone, and when the Porte discovered a friend 
it turned and grasped the proffered hand with all alacrity. 
From that moment for many years the English minister a t  
Constantinople was the virtual master of the destinies of the 
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Turkish empire. Except for one brief moment after 1907, 
Turkey has never since been an actually independent o r  
sovereign state. H e r  policy has been clear and consistent 
throughout. However her masters might change, she has 
fought bravely and served well whomever might be most 
likely to preserve her power. All talk of Turkish indepen- 
dence has been mere cant, and in his foreign policy the Sul- 
tan has cowered like a dog beneath the crack of his master’s 
whip. First it was the Russian, then the Englishman, and 
to-day it is the German; and it has been safe to prophesy 
throughout that whoever wins, Turkey eventually loses. And 
never did any ruling class more richly deserve to lose, as the 
massacres in Greece, the atrocities in Bulgaria, and the cruel- 
ties in Armenia most fully testify. Of all her masters, only 
the Russian has mingled a little of idealism with his selfish- 
ness, and has had in his purpose the final good of shattered 
peoples, o r  has had a t  stake a goal genuinely vital to the 
nation. 
T h e  ruling spirit in England was a representative of the 
great landed aristocracy, Lord  Palmerston. It must be 
remembered that all this was before the days of the two 
great reform bills which were to  give the suffrage to the 
common people and go fa r  toward making England, at  least 
politically, democratic. Palmerston believed in all the 
national movements which were going on in Italy and Hun- 
gary. H e  thought that the British constitution as it stood at  
that time was the last word in the history of human liberty. 
If a country had a House of Commons which represented 
the respectable classes, carefully guarded by a House of 
Lords to represent the aristocracy, what more could it 
desire? It therefore happened that German conservatives 
said that if the devil had a son it must be Palmerston, and 
that English Liberals regarded him as the most dangerous 
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man in Europe. Cobden said that Palmerston was the worst 
minister who had ever ruled England. Later  on, when he 
needed his aid, Palmerston asked Cobden to join his min- 
istry. T h e  great Liberal said that it was impossible on 
account of the words which he had used. “Oh, that’s all 
right; other men are with me who said even harsher things,” 
said Palmerston, with a winning smile. “The difference,” 
answered Cobden, without a smile, “is that I meant them.” 
But it would not be quite fair to call Palmerston a hypocrite. 
H e  used cant without knowing it. H e  was one of those men 
who decide on policies for the most selfish ends and then 
make themselves believe that they are in themselves right. 
H i s  absolute certainty as to his own infallibility was to him 
a source of great political strength, for  with his eloquence 
he was able to persuade other and weaker men against their 
own judgment. Two  men whose names should stand very 
high in any list of statesmen and lovers of humanity are an 
exception-Richard Cobden and John Bright. They always 
saw through him. But, as Palmerston said: “Cobden, 
Bright, and Company don’t count in England to-day.” H e  
doubtless hoped that they would never count. He feared 
with all his soul that the day of reform might come. H e  
distrusted the common people with the ballot in their hands, 
and dreaded a day which must inevitably sweep men of his 
stamp away and put power into the hands of men like “the 
Reverend Gentleman,” as he sarcastically called John Bright 
on the floor of the House of Commons. On two memorable 
occasions, Palmerston’s instinctive dislike for the young 
Republic across the seas almost brought England into war  
with America. 
In  his foreign policy the English minister sought to turn 
the thoughts of his countrymen from dangerous dreams of 
liberty to the glory of the empire. One of the first conse- 
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quences of the outbreak of the war with Russia was to com- 
pel the postponement of Russell’s Reform Bill. Tha t  states- 
man had to  announce to  the House of Commons, in a speech 
broken by emotion, that “his darling had been given to  the 
lions.” Both Nicholas and Napoleon unwittingly played 
into the hands of the English minister. T h e  Russian czar 
had come to England in 1844, and had suggested to  Aber- 
deen, the foreign minister, that there was no essential differ- 
ence between the interests of England and Russia in the 
East, and that the two might well come to  some agreement 
as to the eventual disposition of the “sick man’s’’ property. 
T h e  ministers had listened to this cold-blooded proposal 
with some sympathy, and the paper was filed away in the 
Foreign Office for future reference. All except Palmerston. 
H e  had persuaded himself that Constantinople in the hands 
of Russia would be a vital injury to England. Just how, he 
did not stop to explain. H e  remembered with reverence the 
forgotten policy of his great predecessor Pitt, who was about 
to go to war with Russia about the Black Sea when the storm 
of the French Revolution burst. In later years Gladstone 
was to describe the debt of Europe to the Christian nations 
of the Balkans in a memorable passage of his eloquence: 
“They were like a shelving beach which restrained the ocean. 
Tha t  beach, it is true, is beaten by the waves; it is laid deso- 
late; it produces nothing; it becomes perhaps nothing save 
a mass of shingle, of rock, of almost useless seaweed. But 
it is the fence behind which the cultivated earth can spread 
and escape the incoming tide, and such was the resistance of 
Bulgarians, of Servians, and of Greeks. I t  was that resis- 
tance which left Europe to claim the enjoyment of her own 
religion and to develop her institutions and her laws.” All 
this Palmerston would perhaps have acknowledged, but 
when the issue was one of rivalry with Russia he was willing 
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that the beach should still remain desolate and barren. He 
even went so fa r  as to  talk of “the mild and beneficent rule 
of the Sultan.” At  the very moment when my Lord  Palm- 
erston was talking of Turkish independence, his representa- 
tive in Constantinople, the astute Stratford, was writing the 
Sultan’s notes, and carrying on both sides of a correspon- 
dence with England at  the same time. Later,  “when the 
French and Austrian terms were discussed in the cabinet- 
at the end of the discussion some one modestly asked 
whether it would not be proper to  communicate with Mu- 
surus what was in agitation and what had been agreed upon, 
to  which Clarendon said he saw no necessity whatever; and 
that, indeed, Musurus had recently called upon him, when 
he had abstained from giving him any information whatever 
of what was going on.” When we remember that “what 
was going on” was the determination of the fate of Turkey, 
and that the countrymen of Ambassador Musurus were at 
that moment fighting bravely side by side with the French 
and English in the Crimea, we see clearly what Palmerston 
and Clarendon meant by Turkish sovereignty and indepen- 
dence. Perhaps Palmerston was a hypocrite, after all. 
Under ordinary circumstances it is doubtful whether 
Palmerston could have led the English people into war, 
which he was always saying was inevitable, just as until 
recently some of our American jingoes were telling us that 
war with Japan was inevitable, and therefore presumably 
desirable. But Nicholas listened to the frantic appeals of 
the thoroughly frightened Francis Joseph, and sent his sol- 
diers to  put down the liberal movement in Hungary, which 
they did with great thoroughness and cruelty. Well might 
Louis Kossuth stretch forth his right hand before the crowds 
of London and say, “If it had not been for  Nicholas, I had 
held the Hapsburgs in the hollow of that handl” T h e  
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Czar  was no politician, and he chose the very moment when 
the escaped Hungarian patriot was electrifying crowds in 
England and America with his eloquence-for Kossuth 
spoke English with singular power and grace-to broach 
again, and this time more bluntly, his scheme for the libera- 
tion of the Balkans. H i s  success in Hungary made him feel 
that he too held the Hapsburgs in the hollow of his royal 
hand, and if only England did not interfere the end of 
Turkey had come. H o w  much of bloodshed and of wicked- 
ness and wrong had been prevented had Nicholas had his 
T h e  conversations of the Czar  of Russia with the English 
minister at St. Petersburg are among the most frank and 
remarkable in the whole history of diplomacy. Nicholas 
said he feared that the “sick man” would die suddenly and 
his estate fall into chaos and dissolution. H e  wanted Eng- 
land to agree that Servia, Roumania, and Bulgaria should be 
independent states, with frontiers according to nationality. 
England was to  take Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete to protect 
the line to India. As  to Constantinople, Nicholas was quite 
vague. But he did not want it to  fall into the hands of E n g  
land o r  France. H e  did not want the Greeks to  reestablish 
the Byzantine Empire, and above all he did not want it to 
become a little republic, “a refuge to the Kossuths and 
Mazzinis of Europe”; so it did not take a diplomatic genius 
to divine his real purpose. These proposals, and especially 
the last, shocked terribly the finer moral feelings of Lord 
Palmerston. T h e  English people hated Nicholas with good 
cause as a tyrant. Nicholas proceeded to invade Roumania, 
to sink the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea, and to advance 
victoriously in the Caucasus. And so the war came, virtu- 
ally a war  for  the possession of Constantinople. 
All this time the new Emperor in Paris had been eagerly 
way I 
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awaiting an opportunity to go to war, it did not much matter 
to him just where o r  why. H e  needed a safe little war 
somewhere which might add the glory of arms to the ris- 
ing star of empire and make the French people believe 
that they had a true heir of the “Little Corporal,” whose 
bones lay beneath the stately dome of the Invalides. Louis 
Yhilippe had fallen because the French were bored to death 
by the peaceful, corrupt policy of Guizot, and their new 
Emperor was determined at  least to keep them awake. This 
particular war  suited his purpose to a nicety. I t  would be 
dramatic to fight, side by side with the nation which had sent 
his uncle to St. Helena, against the brother of the Emperor 
who had broken that uncle’s power in 1812. Nicholas had 
addressed him, with ill-concealed contempt, as “my friend,” 
and not “my brother,” when he had reluctantly recognized 
the Second Empire. Palmerston had always been his friend 
when he needed friends sorely enough. And did he not have 
a little quarrel of his own with Nicholas, as to whether the 
Greek o r  Latin monks should hold the key to the Holy 
Manger in Jerusalem? F o r  our Emperor knew how to be 
religious and orthodox in his own way, too! It is true the 
quarrel about the manger had been settled a full year before 
the war started, though our school histories still persist in 
giving it as the cause of the Crimean war ;  but glory is glory, 
and Frenchmen were to die in the winter of the Crimea, and 
to leave their bones in a distant land, as their fathers had 
died for the glory of that other empire when the tricolor had 
first gleamed under all the heavens of Europe, a t  Wagram, 
at Austerlitz, at  Jena, a t  Friedland, and a t  Waterloo. They 
did not know that they were really dying to pull Palmer- 
ston’s chestnuts out of a particularly hot fire. 
I know of only one English writer in recent years who 
points with any pride to the diplomacy which brought about 
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the Crimean war. T h a t  one published his history of the 
nineteenth century in 1913. At  the close of his descrip- 
tion of this episode he says with some condescension: “Cap- 
tious critics of the policy of Lord Palmerston should remem- 
ber that England is to-day in possession of Egypt and 
Cyprus, while Russia is no nearer Constantinople than she 
was in I 853.” T h a t  statement is unfortunately still true, 
but two years after this book was published, England had 
agreed to get Constantinople for  Russia if she could, and 
her brave Australians were dying to secure the very thing 
which Palmerston and all the so-called statesmen of that day 
were so anxious to prevent. All the rest agree that the 
Crimean war “ought to have been and might have been 
avoided.” Or, as one great English diplomat has said, 
“England put her money on the wrong horse I ”  
Even then there were men who could still see clearly. 
Lord Grey said, “ W e  are arming to defend a phantasm, 
for the maintenance of the oppressor’s domination.” Cob- 
den pointed out the remarkable fact that the majority of the 
Sultan’s subjects were passionately on the side of Russia. 
H e  was answered that they ought to know better. Even 
Disraeli, who was himself to make a like mistake, taunted 
the cabinet, “You are going to war with an opponent who 
does not want to fight, and you are unwilling to encounter 
him.” But the whole influence of the press was the other 
way; the character of Nicholas was kept before .the people. 
“The rage for this war gets every day more vehement, and 
nobody seems to fear anything but that we may not spend 
money and men enough in waging it,” said-one observer. 
And so when the war came, it was received with great popu- 
lar enthusiasm. 
1 Marriott, “England Since Waterloo,” p. 250. 
* Paul, “History of Modern England,” I, 332. 
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T o  this very day the fundamental question of the Crimean 
war remains unsolved. W h o  shall be the final heir of the 
unrivalled city on the straits? I t  stands a t  the crossing of 
two great lines of traffic. I t  reaches out to touch two con- 
tinents. When defended with any skill it seems as nearly im- 
pregnable as any place in the world; for, alone among great 
commercial centres, it  is situated at  once on a peninsula and 
a strait. I ts  master owns a house with three doors which he 
may either open to  his friends or  close against his enemies. 
For almost a thousand years after it was founded, this im- 
perial city was believed to  be forever safe. Then, in the 
thirteenth century it changed hands three times, chiefly on 
account of the weakness of its defenders, the Greeks and the 
Venetians, until a t  last it fell into the hands of its present 
owners after the most memorable siege in history, when the 
cross was to  blaze no longer on the incomparable dome of 
St. Sophia. Many times since that it has seemed that the 
Turks were sure to  lose their capital, but always either its 
position o r  the jealous diplomacy of the rival heirs has inter- 
vened at  the last minute to change its fate, and to-day the 
Turk  stands in this gateway of the nations at  least as firmly 
as ever. Historically, besides the Turk,  only Greece and 
Italy could claim some right based on previous ownership. 
Modern Greeks do not forget that for a thousand years 
Greek religion and culture spread from the city on the 
Golden Horn  over Russia and the Balkans. And to-day it 
is beyond question still a dream of men like Venizelos that 
imperial Greece may again hold sway over a united people 
from the shadow of the great cathedral. But one may well 
doubt whether modern Greece will ever have the culture o r  
the strength that will be needed by the power which must hold 
the straits against so many rivals. In its population, Con- 
stantinople is probably the most cosmopolitan city except New 
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York. Just before the present war, she contained I,OOO,OOO 
people, of whom less than half were Turks,  and the re- 
mainder were divided among the various Christian nations, 
with ISO,OOO Greeks and, of course, the ever present colony 
of Jews. T h e  idea of nationality does not seem to apply 
with any certainty to the final and just determination of this 
question. Constantinople would be a source of sentimental 
pride to  the Greek; it would round out the Bulgarian coast 
and possibly add just a little to  the natural strength of the 
Bulgarian position; it is undoubtedly a convenient avenue to  
the German and the Austrian. But to all these it is, after 
all, a luxury, and a luxury which might well prove in the 
long run a source of serious weakness rather than of 
strength. Each has ample access to the sea in other ways, 
unless perchance Austria should lose Trieste. But to  Russia, 
under modern conditions of trade and war, Constantinople 
is not a mere luxury of imperial expansion or of sentimental 
pride. I t  is a vital and compelling necessity. Russia might 
hold these straits without menace o r  injury to any other 
power, but no one else can ever hold them without menace 
to Russia. T h e  heart of Russia lies on the great rivers 
which either lead directly into the Black Sea or, like the 
Volga, are capable of close connection with it through canals. 
Even with railroads, the Baltic and the White seas have no 
ice-free ports. Vladivostok is too far  away, and beyond the 
Persian Gulf there is evidently no real market for the goods 
of Russia. T h e  wheat of Odessa, the oil of the Caucasus, 
must pass out through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. 
And yet in a moment war might come, and shut her off almost 
completely from the rest of the world. With the straits in 
the hands of a possible enemy or  of a mere pawn like Tur-  
key, Russia is compelled to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea 
to prevent just such an attack as she suffered in the Crimean 
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war, and yet that fleet might be shut up and made absolutely 
useless to her. H e r  inability to use the straits helped to 
defeat Russia in her war with Japan. T o  appreciate the 
traditional attitude of Russia to Constantinople, we must 
imagine New York the only Nor th  American port, and that 
port held by Mexico, and Mexico in turn dominated by 
Germany. In such a case it would take no great prophet 
to foresee that in spite of all the peace societies in the world, 
o r  even if we sent delegates once a year to the Hague, some 
day something would break. Russia might give up Poland, 
Finland, and even the Baltic provinces. She might withdraw 
her last soldier from the far-flung extremities of her empire. 
Mongolia, Khiva, Bokhara, and Persia might know her no 
more. But she will never forget Constantinople or willingly 
see it in the hands of a rival. No matter how this war ends; 
no matter whether Russia is to be a monarchy o r  a republic; 
no matter whether she adopts a centralized government o r  
one based upon the local autonomy of her constituent races, 
the dream of that one gateway to the sea is sure to come 
again to haunt her, and to drive her like a mighty giant some 
day to stretch her arms and break her bonds. No treaties, 
no schemes of disarmament will forever keep an empire of 
150,000,000 people from the sea. This  is not imperialism, 
it is the will to life; and Russia is forever the foe of that 
power which holds the straits. T h e  peace of the world will 
not be secure for many years if  Austria loses Trieste, o r  i f  
Germany permanently gains Constantinople. In  the case 
of each city, the political and economic considerations seem 
entirely to outweigh the confused problem of nationality. 
At the time of the Crimean war, the issue seemed to be 
between the Russian and the Turk. It really was between 
the Englishman and the Russian. To-day it is just  as clearly 
between the German and the Russian; and the Bulgarian, 
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the German, and the Turk  are to-day fighting side by side, 
just as the Englishman, the Frenchman, and the Turk  fought 
a half century ago. 
At  the time of the Crimean war there was just one states- 
man in Europe who saw all this clearly and whose advice 
showed genuine foresight. T h a t  man was Bismarck, just 
beginning his remarkable career in Prussia. H e  urged Fred- 
erick William to  throw Prussian influence on Russia’s side, 
and to help her in her struggle against France and England. 
In  all probability, he was already planning to get Strass- 
burg from France and to eject Austria from her dominant 
position in Germany. In  comparison with these ambitions, 
the solution of the Eastern Question seemed to him unim- 
portant. From his point of view, it was really true that all 
the Balkans were not worth one Pomeranian grenadier, as 
he later said. And in the next congress we find Bismarck 
posing as the honest broker for Europe and willing to be an 
Austrian in Servia and a Russian in Bulgaria. Bismarck 
never fully understood the intense feeling of nationality in 
the Balkans, but he did understand the question of Constan- 
tinople. T h e  Turk  was a mere pawn; Constantinople was 
sure to be Russian some day. Why not help her to get it, 
and in the meantime secure a position of leadership for  dis- 
credited Prussia? H e  advised his old master in this vein. 
H e  would have placed a great army in upper Silesia as a 
threat to Austria, and would thus have released the forces 
which Nicholas had to keep idle watching for a possible 
attack from his jealous and ungrateful neighbor. If Nicho- 
las had been able to use his full strength in the Crimea 
against his Western enemies, it seems likely that Russia 
would have won the war even without the loss of a single 
Prussian life. Prussia might even have captured the French 
city of Strassburg while Napoleon was fa r  away storming 
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the defences of Sevastopol, and Prussia instead of France 
would have become the liberator of Italy. T h e  results are 
easy to  foresee. Russia and Prussia would have dominated 
eastern Europe, and Prussia would have gained the mastery 
of the small German states which held aloof for fear of 
France and Austria. In  short, Bismarck’s plan was to fight 
the wars of 1866 and 1870 all a t  once. Even i f  he had not 
gained all his objectives, it is hard to  see how Prussia could 
have lost. Fo r  even i f  Nicholas lost in the Crimea, Prussia 
would be stronger in Germany. But Frederick William did 
not have the vision or  the courage: “ M y  dear boy,” he said, 
“that is all very fine, but it is too expensive for me. A man 
of Napoleon’s kind can afford to  make such master-strokes, 
but not I.” 
As a result, Prussia’s position during the war was most 
ignoble, much to  Bismarck’s chagrin. She kept her army 
where it seemed a threat to  Russia, with whom she had no 
quarrel, and so helped to  bring about the defeat of Nicholas. 
And yet she would not promise to help the allies. Conse- 
quently she barely gained a late admission to the congress 
which was to arrange the terms of peace. 
Austria, too, played but a sorry part. Nicholas thought 
that he had won eternal gratitude from Francis Joseph, 
whose tottering throne had been propped by the bayonets 
of Russia, and that only five years before. But gratitude 
among rulers is proverbially short-lived, and Francis Joseph 
was no exception. Austria had no desire to see Russia grow 
strong on her frontier, and only the fear of an Italian insur- 
rection kept her from sending her soldiers into the Crimea 
against the armies of the Czar.  She dared not do this for  
fear Piedmont might attack her on the plains of Lombardy, 
But she massed her soldiers in Galicia, where she lost as 
many men from cholera as she would have lost in a cam- 
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paign. When it was perfectly safe, she occupied with her 
troops Roumania, which the armies of Nicholas had been 
compelled to evacuate. So Austria made a bitter enemy, 
and was alone in the days of trial in 1859, 1864, and 1866. 
She had paved the way for  her expulsion from Italy and 
Germany, and was to remain isolated and friendless until 
the days of the alliance which has endured so remarkably 
the shock of the present war. 
Piedmont, under Cavour, seized the moment of Austrian 
weakness and hesitation to send a little well-equipped army 
of eighteen thousand men to play their part  in the Crimea 
and to gain a place a t  the council table of the nations for 
their country. Cavour sent his Italians with the famous 
words, “You have the future of your country in your haver- 
sacks,” and the men in the trenches caught the spirit of 
the great prime minister and answered with self-fulfilling 
prophecy, “Out of this mud Italy shall be made.” T h e  
Italian soldiers were destined to  take part in only one 
small skirmish, in which they lost twenty-eight men killed. 
But they fought in a dramatic moment of the great siege, 
and side by side with the greatest powers in Europe, and it 
was true that “in the waters of the Tchernaya the stain of 
Novara was wiped out for  ever.” “Cavour could speak 
with his enemies in the gate.” 
T h e  
allies lost IOO,OOO men in those two terrible winters in the 
Crimea, a number equal to the greatest army which they 
ever had in the field at  one time. Every other man who left 
England amid the early acclamations of the people was 
destined never to come back. Cold had to be endured such 
as Englishmen and Frenchmen had never dreamed possible. 
Then cholera spread. And to these enemies were added 
wretched arrangements of transportation and even poorer 
T o  the rest, the war was grim tragedy enough. 
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generalship. Lord  Raglan was a gallant old gentleman, but 
the task which he had undertaken was quite beyond his very 
moderate abilities. I t  is said that when the French marshal, 
as his subordinate, asked him for  instructions, Raglan placed 
his hand on his heart and answered, “To men like you 
instructions are not given. I simply point and say, ‘There 
is the enemy!’ ” As the Frenchman said, this was gener- 
ous, but it was not war. Some one had constantly blundered. 
T h e  common soldiers of all the armies fought with supreme 
devotion and courage, but each new general made mistakes 
which kept green the memory of his predecessors. Thou- 
sands of shoes were delivered to the freezing soldiers in the 
trenches, all for  the left foot. Boxes of ammunition were 
sent to the base hospitals and drugs to the firing line. 
“Punch” pilloried the selfish greed of the contractors in a 
cartoon entitled, “One man’s preserved meat is another 
man’s poison.” 
In  the meantime, conditions among the Russians in the 
beleaguered city were even worse. T h e  Russian people had 
entered the war with almost the religious enthusiasm of a 
crusade. They were fighting not only for their Czar, but 
for  their nation. Tolstoy visited the men on the front lines, 
and has recorded the quality of their spirit. “The principal 
joyous thought you have brought away with you is a con- 
viction of the strength of the Russian people. Wha t  they do 
is all done so simply, with so little effort, that you feel con- 
vinced that they could do a hundred times as much.” Korni- 
loff, the commander, stands before them and shouts, “Lads, 
we will die, but we will not surrender Sevastopol I ”  and from 
down the long lines comes ringing back the echo of his 
words, “We will die! Hurrah!” And die they did. T h e  
figures of Russian losses given by the most conservative 
authorities are almost beyond belief, greater than the losses 
88 Nineteenth Century Peace Congresses 
of any other army of equal size in modern times. Nicholas 
lost a full half million of the army of a million with which 
he started the war.l And the worst of it was that most of 
them died on account of red tape and lack of food. I t  was 
said that every road in southern Russia was lined with the 
bodies of the dead. One famous order was endorsed twenty- 
one times and was as yet unobeyed. Ox-carts were requisi- 
tioned from the peasants, and were then piled in great heaps 
unused. T h e  whole system of which Nicholas was so proud 
had broken down completely. H e  had counted on Generals 
January and February to fight for him. But these grim 
generals distributed their ghastly favors with equal hand. 
After the loss of the first battle he felt that the hand of 
fate was on him and gave up all hope. “I cannot change,” 
he said to his son. In 1848 he had said to  his nobles, “Let 
us forget mutual grievances. Give your hands to one an- 
other as brothers, as children of our mother-country, so that 
the last hand may reach me, and then, under my leadership, 
rest sure that no earthly power can disturb us.” They had 
taken him at  his word, and he had failed. T h e  man was 
weary, broken-hearted. In  February he developed a slight 
cold. H e  refused to take even the most ordinary precau- 
tions, and died on the second of March, 1855. His  last 
words to his son were, “I leave you a disordered house.” 
“Punch” had another grim cartoon which showed “General 
February,” as Death, laying an icy hand on the old man’s 
heart. 
T h e  failure of Nicholas, however, was to  bring some meas- 
ure of good to the Russian people. Alexander I1 as heir had 
been as reactionary as his father or  his son after him. At  heart 
he was always an autocrat, even when he was called “The 
1 Cambridge Modern History, IX, 324. 
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Czar  Liberator.” But the necessities of the hour pressed the 
situation home to him with compelling force. Russia was 
full of great indignation and contempt. T h e  people knew 
that the tragedies of the war were not their fault. T h e  new 
Czar  was threatened with revolt more dangerous to  his 
house than any foreign enemy. There had been five hun- 
dred riots in the lifetime of his father. T h e  next riot might 
be a revolution. Something had to  be done, for Alexander 
was determined not to be another Louis XVI. H e  had the 
wisdom to see the danger and to  make an immediate promise 
of reform. Within the next ten years the serfs were liber- 
ated, a t  least on paper;  the legal system was changed and 
made more just; and some beginning was made in the direc- 
tion of local self-government for  Russia by the creation of 
local assemblies which should represent the peasants, the 
burghers, and the nobles. In  these assemblies seems to lie 
the hope for an orderly democracy in Russia to-day. T h e  
liberated peasant was made responsible to  his village for the 
little patch of six or seven acres which the typical family 
received, and all the land was to  be paid for in forty-nine 
years. T h e  final payments were made at  last in 1910, and 
for the first time the average Russian peasant became an in- 
dividual landowner. In the long run this change, here briefly 
sketched, was probably the most enduring consequence of 
the Crimean war. 
Wi th  the fall of Sevastopol, all were anxious for peace 
except Palmerston and the Queen. England had made great 
sacrifices of men, money, and, most of all, of reputation, as 
was to  be evident when the great Mutiny broke out in India 
the next year. But Napoleon would not go on, and there 
was no use trying to  fight on alone, especially since it would 
be almost impossible to  tell what they were fighting for. 
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When Kars fell into his hands, it seemed to Alexander that 
a favorable moment had come to sue for peace, and the 
diplomats assembled in Paris to arrange the terms. 
The  chief issue of the war had already been settled by 
events and was beyond the reach of diplomacy. Constanti- 
nople was to remain Turkish, and that empire was to have 
its sovereignty and independence guaranteed by the joint 
action of the three allied powers, England, Austria, and 
France. T h e  Sultan was to have complete dominion over 
his Christian subjects, and that was to mean in practice the 
right to  murder and to  rob,-although he was quite willing 
to make the usual virtuous promises, which no one except 
Palmerston even pretended to  believe. There remained 
much simpler problems than had confronted the earlier con- 
gress. What  should be done with the Black Sea and the 
Danube? These were the questions which the diplomats 
had to discuss during that single month of March, 1856. N o  
territory changed hands except a little strip near the mouth 
of the Danube which was taken from defeated Russia and 
given to one of the two principalities which were to be united 
two years later into the modern kingdom of Roumania. 
England gained nothing at all, and Napoleon nothing but 
the glory of being hdst a t  the conference and helping to  dic- 
tate from the seclusion of the Tuileries the terms of peace. 
Men might well ask, “Was it for this that so many hardships 
have been suffered and that 600,000 brave soldiers have 
died ?” 
T h e  congress itself was much smaller and more definitely 
organized than the one which had met half a century before. 
This  time the kings were not in evidence, but sent their 
servants to  do the work for them. This  fact in itself indi- 
cates a considerable development of the idea of the state 
as distinguished from its ruler. Six states were represented, 
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first and last, and their delegates came in two by two, like 
the animals into the ark. They sat in twelve arm-chairs 
around a table covered with green velvet, in the Hal l  of 
the Ambassadors, and met every other afternoon a t  three. 
There  was a little side table for the secretaries. Etiquette 
was by this time definitely established. I n  international con- 
gresses the host acts as chairman and his colleague as secre- 
tary. Thus, if there should be a congress a t  Washington, 
the President would be the natural chairman, and the Secre- 
tary of State would be secretary, and the delegates would be 
arranged alphabetically, starting at the President’s right 
hand, quite after the fashion of a formal dinner,-for ex- 
ample, Austria on his right and Brazil on his left, and so on. 
There is no chance for  a modern Talleyrand to crowd into 
a good seat. This  scheme is probably the best available in a 
jealous world, but might evidently be unjust to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. 
T h e  formal meetings were interspersed with festivities 
and celebrations. By a curious coincidence, the Prince Im- 
perial was born during the sessions, and the delegates ad- 
journed to file past the cradle. One records that he had 
blue eyes and that across his breast was placed the cordon of 
the Legion of Honor.  Years later this boy was to die a 
tragic death in Zululand. But his birth seemed to the people 
of Paris a symbol of the peace which was to come, and they 
received the news with acclamations, for they hated “Plon- 
Plon,” the Emperor’s cousin, who was the heir apparent. 
If we had dropped in on the meetings around the green vel- 
vet table, we must have thought that it was a dress rehearsal 
for a comic opera. Indeed, in this circus, as some one has 
remarked, the side show was really more interesting than the 
main tent, and some affairs of greater moment were settled 
in private interviews with the silent man in the Tuileries than 
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in the Hal l  of the Ambassadors. For  Napoleon was, after 
all, a man of real ability and of genuine ideals. I t  is note- 
worthy, by way of contrast with the next congress which 
shall meet, that four of the states were virtually absolute 
monarchies, and two were aristocracies. There was no rep- 
resentative of a democracy, for even in England and in Pied- 
mont the suffrage was very limited. I t  was a curious fact 
that the only self-made man was the Turkish grand vizier. 
All the rest were nobles. 
A t  the head of the table, presiding over the deliberations, 
sat Walewski, son of the great Napoleon and of a Polish 
countess. Born in I 8 IO, he had been rescued from obscurity 
when his kinsman became emperor. Louis Napoleon evi- 
dently believed in the hereditary character of genius, and 
Walewski became the foreign minister of France. Napoleon 
always placed men in power whose fortunes were entirely 
bound with his and whom he could therefore count on, 
Somehow Walewski, a loud-talking, rattle-brained man, had 
escaped all traces of his great father’s genius. H e  had a 
habit of getting started to prove some proposition, becom- 
ing lost in the flow of his own oratory, and ending by proving 
with the greatest emphasis the very thing which his oppo- 
nent desired. W e  are told by one who was present that on 
these occasions his colleague Benedetti, who was secretary 
and sat across the table, would wait until the chairman was 
not looking, and then “raised his eyes to heaven, held his 
head in his hands, shrugged his shoulders, and uttered dis- 
creet sighs,” as much as to say, “What  can you expect?” It 
was well for  France that nothing really vital was at stake. 
Buol represented Austria. H e  had stopped on his way 
to Paris to  tell Bismarck that Prussian interests would be 
safe in his hands. Bismarck summed him up, “If I could 
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be as great for a single hour as Buol thinks he is all the time, 
I should establish my glory forever before God and man.” 
“ T o  listen to Buol,” Orloff, the bluff old Russian, remarked 
to Cavour, “you would suppose that Austria had taken 
Sevastopol.” And so we might go on around that table. 
W h a t  a strange crowd, and what a pitiful world of human 
beings to leave the arrangement of their destinies to such 
men ! 
Only one man a t  that table is to-day remembered by the 
world. H e  had planned through the years to be present, 
and men had died to send him there. I n  the fact of that 
man’s presence lay, unrevealed but real, the whole future 
destiny of Italy. Metternich, watching from his thoughtful 
retirement, said of him: “To-day there is one diplomat in 
Europe, and unfortunately he is against us.’’ H e  too, like 
Talleyrand, had expected to play but a sorry part. Pied- 
mont had made great sacrifices, and all depended on the 
skill with which this little, unimposing, bespectacled indi- 
vidual had read the character of the Emperor. Could he 
depend on the mixed idealism and fear of that adventurer? 
Would he have a chance to present the wrongs of Italy, so 
that they would blaze before the eyes of Europe and no one 
would dare to interfere when her great hour came? All 
this he had planned and hoped; and yet he feared. There is 
an astonishing similarity between the careers of Talleyrand 
at  the Congress of Vienna and of Cavour at  the Congress 
of Paris. “I t  is possible,” Cavour wrote to his colleague, 
“it is even probable that this mission will be the last act of 
my political life.” When he went to Paris he was not even 
sure that the great powers would admit him to the congress. 
But they could not forget the sacrifices of Piedmont, and the 
two Italians arrived punctually to the minute at  the first 
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meeting. Clarendon now played the part  of Castlereagh, 
and said to Cavour with the patronizing air of a great states- 
man to an amateur: “You have too much tact to take part  in 
affairs which in no way concern you. You will be present at 
the discussion, and think of something else.” One feels like 
asking, H o w  intimately was England herself concerned in 
the destiny of the Black Sea? If Clarendon’s test had been 
applied, all should have “thought of something else” except 
the Russians and the Turks. But it was a world of great 
powers, and the little fellows must not meddle. 
Cavour assumed his r6le of modest and interested atten- 
tion, and played it with consummate tact and skill. H e  had 
rare social ability and, except on one famous occasion, per- 
fect self-control. H e  listened with profound admiration to 
the words which fell from the great men’s lips, much as a 
newly admitted young partner in a firm might sit at his first 
meeting. T o  think that the one man of genius must remain 
silent a t  that table of chattering fools! And he doubtless 
thought of something else, as he had been ordered! He 
thought of glorious Venice groaning under a foreign yoke; 
he thought of Milan and of Florence, where once the world 
had gone to school, and of the brave men who had died to 
make them free; he thought of Imperial Rome and of the 
day when the City on the Seven Hills should once more be 
the capital of a great free people; he thought of Naples on 
her rounding bay, and of her noisome dungeons filled with 
untried prisoners. As he looked across the table a t  noisy 
Buol, he must have thought of Austria, whose soldiers were 
the cause of all these wrongs. And when the moment came 
he spoke in words which burned and seared, with all the 
restrained power of great eloquence. In  spite of Buol’s 
angry protests, the congress had committed itself to the 
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cause of Italy, and from that moment Italy was destined to  
be free. I wonder whether ever before or since one single 
speech has been staged so carefully, o r  has meant so much. 
As for  the rest, let us remember that the Black Sea was 
neutralized, both Russia and Turkey being forbidden to  
have either fleets upon its waters o r  forts upon its shores. 
This  “negative servitude,” as the lawyers call such provi- 
sions, was destined to  last only until the first moment came 
when Russia could throw off its galling restriction. Kars, a t  
the gate of Armenia,whose fall had shed a single ray of lustre 
on the Russian arms, was given back to  the Turk,  to  use in 
his own bloody and nefarious way. T h e  three great powers 
guaranteed the sovereignty and independence of both Swe- 
den and Turkey, which might be threatened by Russia, and 
the great river Danube was neutralized and opened to  the 
traffic of the world, under an international commission. T h e  
beneficent provisions of this idea lasted until the present war. 
Above all, certain general rules, called the Declaration of 
Paris, were adopted which were to  protect neutral com- 
merce in time of war. Neutral goods were to  be safe on 
enemy ships, except contraband of war ;  and, conversely, 
even enemy goods were to  be safe on neutral ships. Priva- 
teering was abolished, and the rule was laid down that no 
blockade should be legal unless it actually prevented access 
to  the enemy coast. These are the first international pro- 
visions dealing with the freedom of the seas, and are memo- 
rable for  that reason, though they have been honored so 
much more in the breach than the observance, and have 
failed so completely to  safeguard neutral rights in the pres- 
ent war. They were expected to  make neutral property a t  
sea safe in time of war. To-day the world seems to  have 
taken a step back, and the issue is not whether property can 
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be made safe, but whether the most fundamental of rights 
can be defended, and the lives of non-combatant men, 
women, and children guarded against sudden and treacher- 
ous attack on the broad, uncharted highways of the sea. 
T h e  treaty of Paris was signed on the thirtieth of March, 
1856, and the congress adjourned amid the ringing bells and 
the plaudits of a happy people. 
